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This paper presents evidence that balance sheet effects are critical determinants of both the 
likelihood of a crisis and of income losses following a crisis. The paper tests the validity of 
“insurance” and “liquidity” models of currency crisis. Both models predict that the occurrence of 
a balance of payments crisis is conditional on the health of the nation’s accounts vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. Problems in the balance sheet either cause a financial crisis that develops into a run 
on the Central Bank, or generate a run on the Central Bank once contingent liabilities exceed 
reserves and the yield differential moves against domestic assets. Estimations of crisis likelihoods 
based on several specifications of single and simultaneous equation probit models confirm that 
output losses following the crisis are persistent and conditional on the balance sheet indicator, i.e. 
the ratio of the stock of gross external liabilities to assets. Measures of contingent liabilities, 
capital flight, and financial depth perform well as crisis predictors, and the marginal effects on the 
probability of a crisis are of the expected sign. The panel data set covers the time period 1973 
through 2003 for 90 countries. 
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d1: Introduction  
 
Two questions are raised in this paper: how well currency crises are predicted by external 
asset-liability mismatches, and whether these balance sheet effects also generate persistent output 
losses following a crisis. The theoretical literature supports the idea that asset-liability mismatches 
underpin currency crises (Chang and Velasco, 1998 and 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Dooley, 
2000). Liquidity models place the responsibility for the crisis on a mismatch between short-term assets 
and liabilities. Insurance models emphasize that Central Bank’s contingent liabilities determine the 
timing of the crisis. According to both theories, the interaction between easy borrowing and the Central 
Bank’s role as lender of last resort generates moral hazard and a financial crisis that drains, as one of 
its final symptoms, reserve assets. A crisis of this nature must generate output losses while the financial 
sector struggles to recover its footing and the authorities institute regulatory reforms. In order to clarify 
the transmission effects of the balance sheet indicators used, this paper applies single and 
simultaneous equation probit techniques to  a model-based specification of the crisis. The panel data 
set includes gross external asset and liability stocks over the period 1973-98 for 90 developed and 
developing countries. Out-of-sample likelihood forecasts are generated for the period 1998-2003 and 
are a good fit with observed probabilities.  
The relevant theoretical literature has largely grown out of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Models 
emphasize that imperfect financial structures combined with borrowing booms and asset price bubbles 
in emerging markets lead to large inflows of capital as long as yield differentials favor domestic assets 
(Chang and Velasco, 1998 and 1999; Dooley, 2000). The Central Bank, in its capacity as lender of last 
resort, insures these growing domestic liabilities, which are denominated in terms of the reserve 
currency. This insurance function creates a moral hazard problem as incentives facing domestic 
financial intermediaries are inconsistent with preserving the high rates of return on domestic assets. As 
the Central Bank’s contingent liabilities grow and exceed Central Bank reserves, returns on domestic 
currency denominated assets fall. Once the yield differential moves against domestic assets, excess 
demand for foreign assets leads to a collapse in the value of domestic currency or to a balance of 
payments crisis. The crisis in turn manifests as an explosion in the value of reserve currency 
denominated liabilities and pushes the consolidated banking sector deeper in the red. Cespedes, 
Chang, and Velasco (2004) present a model in which this fear of financial collapse engenders “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) and thus postpones the cessation of intervention in exchange 
markets.  The crisis therefore weakens the financial sector’s ability to perform its essential function of 
growth facilitation through intermediation. It also has an adverse effect on foreign investors’ ratings of 
the country’s ability to absorb and repay lending, which causes a “sudden stop” in capital inflows at a 
time when they are most needed (Calvo et al, 2004). The result is a credit crunch at a time when the 
Central Bank should be and generally is raising real interest rates. Thus we expect to some persistence 
in output losses following a crisis, and the likelihood of output losses should be a function of the 
external liability-asset mismatch, since this is precisely what determines the cost of recovery.   
Common prescriptions include imposing temporary capital account restrictions and relying on 
IMF lending to bolster international reserves while implementing financial reforms to reduce potential 
imbalances. Clarifying the transmission mechanisms is a prerequisite to establishing the validity of such 
policy advice for developing countries as well as the cost of ignoring it. This is especially true given that 
many developing countries (Mexico in 1994, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1997, Brazil and Russia in 
1998, Argentina in 2000, Turkey in 2002, and Antigua-Barbuda in 2004) have experienced crises over 
the last decade and a half, and many others are in the process of capital account liberalization, or fear it 
because of the implicit threat of an increase in external exposure and vulnerability to exogenous 
shocks.  
A central feature of these models is the conflict between the policy objectives of stabilization 
and the desire to facilitate borrowing. This may take the form of easing restrictions on financial 
intermediaries or providing insurance. The other important difference between these models and the 
first and second generations of currency crisis models (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1994), is 
the implicit output cost of the crisis. A third distinguishing feature is the active role of the Central Bank, 
as lender of last resort and provider of financial insurance, as opposed to the passivity of monetary 
authorities in the earlier models. All of these point to modeling the crisis through the interaction between 
the Central Bank and the domestic financial sector, and also emphasize the importance of institutional 
reform as a crisis preventive measure. Institutional reform is slow and expensive, and in many 
developing countries involves dealing with people who have never really experienced it. This paper 
contributes to the literature by explicitly identifying the costs of financial booms and busts and by 
providing firm evidence that output losses following the crisis are conditional on balance sheet 
indicators, and that financial reform and regulation is therefore a prerequisite to, and not merely 
something to think about a little bit, before capital account liberalization is to be considered.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a generic model based 
on the most influential post-1997 crisis theories, Section 2 outlines the empirical model, Section 3 has the results of the probit analysis on crises and output losses, while Section 4 concludes. Table 1A in the 
appendix summarizes the key empirical literature for the interested reader.  
 
2: The Underlying Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical motivation presented here is based on combined features of the liquidity 
(Chang and Velasco, 1998 and 1999; Cespedes et al, 2004), and insurance (Dooley, 2000; Chinn and 
Kletzer, 1999) models. 
  The economy is small, credit constrained, and open, with a domestic currency that has been 
pegged to the US dollar in order to stabilize domestic inflation and the value of the US dollar 
denominated debt owed to foreign residents. Exchange rate targeting is based on the monetarist model 
of exchange rates (Girton and Roper, 1977). Pressure in exchange markets can therefore only be the 
result of disequilibrium between the demand for and supply of domestic assets.  
Purchasing power parity is assumed to hold, though it is not a critical assumption. Domestic 
and foreign interest rates are linked through the risk premium, which therefore determines the relative 
demand for domestic assets according to a covered parity relationship. There are four agents: foreign 
creditors, financial intermediaries, borrowers who generate income from capital assets, and the Central 
Bank, which is the lender of last resort. All investments mature within one period, and there is no stock 
of inherited capital, though creditors can renew their commitment to this economy if they choose to do 
so. If a crisis occurs, it happens between time t and t+1.  
Equations 1a through 6 describe the economy. Equations 7 and 8 derive the crisis index. 
Equations 9 and 10 state that the likelihood of a crisis followed by output losses increases with the 
government’s contingent liabilities and with the ratio of liabilities to assets.  
Domestic output and employment depends only on the supply of capital, from both domestic 
and foreign sources, as in equations 1a and 1b.  
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t y i m − =φ           (1d) “y” is domestic output per period and “A” is the time-varying productivity coefficient on capital supplied, 
or the promised rate of return on domestic assets held by creditors, domestic and foreign that will 
mature in t+1. This return, net of borrower’s and financial intermediary’s economic profit rate, must be 
higher that on foreign assets. “l” and “d” represent the respective flow of foreign and domestic finance of 
capital in the home economy in period t, and “η” is the proportion of capital lost to capital flight, adjusted 
for the cost of liquidating capital assets before they mature (assumed to be a deadweight loss that 
benefits no one). If creditors wait for the full term, no capital flight occurred, and η = 0. Thus, the crisis 
must occur, if at all, between t and t+1. 
“iF” is the risk-free interest rate on endowed foreign assets, “kF”, held by domestic residents, 
and “kD” is the total flow of capital that can be put to work at home in period t, but has to be repaid at the 
beginning of t+1. The net marginal product of capital in this economy is therefore given by equation 2. 
Equation 1(c) defines equilibrium in the domestic asset market. “md” and “ms” denote the 
demand for and supply of domestic currency respectively.  
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Where f() and g() are specified to be monotonically increasing. Equation 3 states that new investment 
and capital “destruction” both depend on the risk premium. 
 






t E i i r ε          ( 4 )  
 
Where    is the risk premium on domestic assets in time “t”. “i
p
t r D” is the domestic interest rate and “ε” is 
the rate of depreciation.  As the risk premium rises, either the domestic interest rate increases, or there 
must be an expectation that the domestic currency will depreciate, or a combination of both. 
The risk premium links domestic and foreign asset markets and therefore is the key determinant of 
the expected price of domestic assets, on which the supply of foreign capital (or the demand for 
domestic assets) depends. It is an increasing function of the cost of monitoring financial intermediaries 
in the given regulatory environment (Cespedes et al, 2004) and of the probability of default on loan 
repayments, which in turn is proxied by the size of external liabilities relative to external assets.  Since 
foreign lenders cannot observe the effectiveness of domestic financial intermediation, the Central Bank  of this credit-constrained economy provides insurance (Dooley, 2000) equivalent to the difference 
between the dollar purchase price of the asset and the dollar sale price of the asset, if this difference is 
positive. Equation 5 is an expression for this liability at time T, in terms of expectations formed in time t, 
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In equation 5, “s” is the spot rate at the time of purchase/sale of the asset, “ ) ( T t t s E s ” reflects 
the expected exchange risk on domestic asset returns, and T<t+1. “ ” is the 
expectation formed in time t of the Central Bank’s contingent liability in T on domestic currency 
holdings. Given the huge volume of the domestic currency component of the overall contingent 
liability, ratios such as total bank credit relative to national output and/or quasi money relative 
to reserve assets can be used as proxies in the empirical implementation. 
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D
T t L E
 This insurance cost is therefore increasing in expected devaluation and in the risk premium, 
through l and ŋ. Expectations of devaluations are based on creditors’ estimate of exchange market 
pressure , which in turn is their observation of the Central Bank’s level of intervention activity in 
exchange markets. As intervention increases, estimates of the Central Bank’s contingent liabilities, L, 
are revised up, and creditors must determine if the time path of L is sustainable given holdings of 
reserve assets.  The structural equation can be written as follows: 
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Where h(.) is monotonically increasing. 
 
The demand for domestic assets therefore depends on the mismatch between external liabilities 
and assets and the Central Bank’s contingent liabilities. This is because of the informational asymmetry 
that foreign lenders cannot observe the true nature of financial regulation. They can however estimate 
the burden and sustainability of insurance by observing the size of the contingent claims on the Central 
Bank, and they can estimate exchange risk exposure by observing intervention activity.  Domestic financial intermediaries’ are the middleman between foreign creditors and domestic 
borrowers. Their profits are increasing in the purchase of domestic assets, on which they charge fees 
and commissions and earn a returns spread. Foreign lenders purchases are insured because of the 
informational asymmetry underlying equation 6, which encourages a lending boom, and an increase in 
the profits of domestic banks, which can rely on the Central Bank to monetize their losses (Chinn and 
Kletzer, 1999). This leads to the moral hazard problem: domestic banks have little incentive to screen 
domestic borrowers. 
As the ratio of external liabilities to external assets increases, both domestic and foreign residents 
revise their estimates of the risk premium upward. This reduces relative demand for domestic assets 
and increases pressure in the exchange market. Meanwhile, as contingent liabilities increase, expected 
devaluation increases also, which further reduces demand for domestic assets. Creditors start “flying” 
their capital out of the country1, not just to avoid exchange risk exposure, but also to avoid appropriation 
of assets or additional penalties associated with “emergency” capital controls.  
Fearing the output consequences of a “sudden stop” in capital flows and the destabilizing effect on 
dollarized external debt of a devaluation (Cespedes et al, 2004), the Central bank defends the 
exchange rate by purchasing domestic assets with foreign reserve assets. Observation of heightened 
intervention activity raises questions as to the sustainability of insurance provision, given the backdrop 
of an increasing liability to asset ratio.  Fearing an increase in domestic interest rates, foreign lenders 
sell their domestic assets. The Central Bank can try to negotiate with lenders and with the IMF, but 
exchange market pressure continues to build, raising the risk of default on foreign currency 
denominated loans, which would balloon as a result of the devaluation. The result is an acceleration of 
the “run” on the Central Bank, leading to the currency crisis. 
In order to tie the pieces together, we need to motivate the crisis. The nominal exchange rate is 
targeted through the usual policy instruments – changes in reserves and in interest rates. We assume 
that the Central Bank’s exchange market intervention activity follows the monetarist convention 
(Weymark, 1995, Eichengreen et al, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart; 1999). The build up of exchange 
market pressure is therefore motivated through asset market disequilibrium. The fall in the relative 
                                                 
1 In some cases, this can be interpreted literally. During the Argentine crisis, foreign banks' were accused of 
loading billions of dollars onto 385 armored trucks, which transported the cash to Ezeiza International airport in 
Buenos Aires at the end of November, to be sent to the United States. Money sent to smaller airports is alleged to 
have ended up in Paraguay and Uruguay. 
 demand for domestic assets generates excess demand for foreign assets as in equation 7, which can 
only be absorbed through changes in asset prices - exchange rates and interest rates – or through 
quantitative adjustments in the relative supplies of foreign and domestic assets. Since the only reserve 
currency denominated assets at the Central Bank’s disposal are foreign reserves, which are strictly 
finite, the  scope for quantitative adjustment is limited – asset price realignments become unavoidable. 
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Where “EMP” is exchange market pressure, and “ε ~” indicates the “shadow” exchange rate at which 
the asset market would be in equilibrium, i.e., demand for domestic assets (including currency) would 
equal supply. This shadow exchange rate is typically modeled as a function of everything that 
determines relative yield on domestic assets – growth, change in money supply, and the risk premium, 
and is measured by actual changes in the exchange rate and the policy instruments. 
“I” is the share of exchange market pressure relieved through changes in the policy 
instruments, and “r” represents Central Bank’s foreign reserves. “θ” is the weight on changes in the 
policy instruments and converts these changes into units equivalent to the change in the exchange rate 
( ) (
D i r d EMP d ∆ + ∆ = θ ). “θ” can also be interpreted as the policy instrument elasticity with 
respect to exchange market pressure.  
As reserve assets start to dwindle relative to contingent liabilities, and external liabilities grow 
relative to “appropriable” external assets, foreign creditors estimate that there is an increased 
probability of default on loans and that the Central Bank will find it costlier to provide insurance. This 
reduces external financing, or even reverses its direction. Ultimately, the demand for domestic assets 
could reach a point at which the Central Bank is forced to let the exchange rate float, at least until a 
new, and hopefully more credible, commitment can be made. The crisis occurs between t and t+1, at 
some threshold value of the EMP, say EMP*. 
  The probability of a crisis is therefore a function of the cost of insurance, the 
probability of default as proxied by the ratio of external liabilities to assets, domestic credit to the private 
sector (which reflects the “easy lending” lending environment), capital flight, and reserve assets, as in equation 9. Capital flight is typically a measure of private expectations regarding the exchange rate and 
the future relative price of domestic and foreign assets. In this context, it becomes a measure of 
domestic agents’ ability to prevent expropriation of their assets once the Central Bank runs out of 
reserves.  
Since output depends only on capital, a sudden stop in inflows and pressure on financial 
intermediaries, will increase the likelihood of a recession. The likelihood of an output loss following a 
crisis therefore is conditional on the risk premium, or on the “burden” of providing insurance to holders 
of domestic assets and currency, and the ratio of external assets to liabilities.  
) , , , / , ( ) Pr( 1 r k d k l L Crisis
D
t T
F − = + η ψ         ( 9 )  
) / , ( ) 0 Pr(
F k l L y φ = < ∆          ( 1 0 )  
 
3: Empirical Methodology and Data 
 
The empirical methodology is to try various specifications of single and simultaneous equation 
probit models. This allows testing for the timing of the crisis as well as for threshold levels of 
fundamentals in a very transparent manner. Several authors have used similar estimation techniques 
(for example, Eichengreen et al, 1995; Glick and Hutchison, 2001; Tornell, 1999). Three events are 
considered: the occurrence of a crisis, the occurrence of a recession, and the occurrence of a 
persistent output losses following a crisis. The marginal impact of the independent variables on the 
probability of the event taking place can be calculated from the estimated coefficients. 
The intuition behind the identifying equations is as follows. The ability of the policymaker to 
ward off the crisis (Crisis*) is not something that can be observed directly. The actual event of a crisis at 
time “T” can however be directly observed. The intervention index of equation 8 can then be used to 
calculate the  impact of a 1% change in the explanatory variables in equation 9 on the likelihood of a 
crisis.  We can also observe whether or not a crisis was followed by persistent output losses (recession 
in T+1 and T+2) and whether or not a recession occurred unconditional on the event that there was a 
crisis. There are therefore three events around which the probit estimations are set up. 
  The notation is as follows: 
Dummyj = 0 if event “j” did not occur; =1 if event “j” did occur. 
“j” = 1, 2, 3; j = 1 when event = crisis in period T; j = 2 when event = recession in periods t+1 
and t+2;  j = 3 when event=recession in periods T+ 1 and T+ 2.  In the second event, we are measuring the unconditional probability of a recession as opposed to event 3, which only considers output losses 
post-crisis. 
"i" indexes the countries in the sample; t refers to the time subscript. In sample estimation was 
implemented for 1973-98 (not reported) and 1973-2003 as a robustness check. 
“v” is the matrix of variables and is based on equations 9 and 10. The expected likelihood of 
the event is therefore modeled as a non-linear function of the variables included in “v”. 
β is the vector of parameters that reflect the impact of “v” on the probability that the event 
occurs.  
 
Single Equation Specifications:  
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The solution method is based on maximum likelihood estimation. The joint probability or 
likelihood function follows a normal distribution. Each observation is a single draw from a Bernoulli 
distribution, and the probability of a success is F (β’v). 
Inference in the probit framework is based on predicted probabilities from which we can 
estimate marginal effects. The marginal effects capture the individual variables’ impact on the likelihood 
of the occurrence of the dependent variable and are interpreted as in equation 12. 
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Where  ) (t φ  is the standard normal density. Similarly, we can derive the likelihood of a 
recession, the probability of persistent output losses conditional on a crisis having occurred, and the 
impact on these probabilities and conditional probabilities of a change in our regressors. 
 
Simultaneous Equation Model: 
 
The probability of a crisis and the impact on growth are jointly estimated in a simultaneous 
equation framework. As a robustness check, two models are specified. This accounts for the possibility that a crisis generates persistent output losses, as opposed to the likelihood that output losses following 
a crisis depend on balance sheet indicators, as in equation 11b. 
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Where, [ 1 it ε  , 2 it ε ] ~ N (0, 1), and both regression equations (13a and 13b) include common 
regressors – measures of contingent liabilities, and the ratio of external liabilities to external assets. In 
addition to the seemingly unrelated bivariate specification, the joint conditional probabilities are 
estimated based on the specification contained in equation 14. 
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Equations 13a, 13b, and 14 jointly test for output losses and the likelihood of a crisis and for whether 
the single equation results are biased because of endogeneity.  
The specification is based on equations 9 and 10. All variables are in 1990 US dollars. The 
sample includes 90 developed and developing countries over a wide variety of geographical regions 
with a great deal of heterogeneity in their political and institutional environments. In addition, countries 
with total M2 (money + quasi-money) less than 2 billion in 1998 are classified as small (Bossone, 
Honohan and Long, 2001). 
The right-hand side variables include stock of external liabilities to assets, measures of capital 
flight, domestic credit to the banking sector, liabilities as a proportion of non-gold reserves, M2 as a 
proportion of non-gold reserves, a dummy that captures whether there was a decline in output in the 
previous period, and change in current account. The methodology used to update the balance sheet 
items can be found in Kraay et al (2000) .  Capital flight is calculated as a cumulation of “errors and 
omissions” starting from the first available date, adjusted for differences between net non-equity liability 
flows, minus the foreign debt stock as reported by the World Bank. The expected signs on the 
coefficients are summarized in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 The crisis index, based on equation 8, is computed in two ways. The first, as in equation 15a, is the 
measure developed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). The idea here is to capture periods when 
intervention activity in the domestic exchange market was relatively intense, and not just events that are 
recorded as a crisis.  As interest rate data is not available for a number of countries in the sample, the 
only policy instrument considered is changes in reserve assets of the Central Bank. Since exchange 
rates are more volatile than reserves, the weight on the latter is higher as can be seen from equation 
15a. Reserves adjust in the opposite direction to exchange rates when there is pressure to intervene. 
The second measure (equation 15b) does not use country specific weights, but generates a very similar 
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The standard deviations of the exchange rate and reserve changes are taken over the estimation 
sample, and changes in reserves are measured as excess over the corresponding change in the US. 
The crisis is then recorded as the event that intervention activity exceeds the average by a half 
standard deviation.   
 
Crisisit = 1 if  ) ( . 5 . ) ( sample sample it EMP stdev EMP mean EMP + >     (16) 
 
Typically, higher thresholds – up till 2.5 standard deviations – are used for higher frequency data.  
 
4: Empirical Results  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the simultaneous equation probit model (equation 14). The 
SURE (equations 13(a) and 13(b)) results provide a robustness check that this specification is 
appropriate. It is important to note the question being asked here is are output losses preceded by 
crises, affected by the health of the balance sheet? The econometric analysis suggests that the answer 
is yes. There is strong evidence of endogeneity between crises and persistent output losses in  
 
(Insert Table 2 here)  
countries (with persistent defined as two years into the future). The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis 
of zero endogeneity at 1 percent.  
As suggested by the theoretical motivation outlined in Section 2, a worsening (increase in) 
balance sheet – as indicated by the ratio of external liabilities outstanding to the stock of external assets 
– raises both the probability of a “costly” crisis and the likelihood of a persistent output loss in the 
afflicted country. The other key determinant of the cost of the crisis is financial depth as measured by 
domestic credit to the banking sector. Higher domestic credit cushions the economy from the output 
loss and reduces the likelihood of a crisis, suggesting that the transmission mechanism of the crisis 
also determines its cost, i.e., the extent of the credit crunch.  
Exposure on contingent liabilities, as measured by the ratio of M2 to non-gold reserves, does 
significantly increase the likelihood of a crisis, but while entering with the expected sign in the output-
loss equation is not significant there. This is also true of capital flight: it is a significant crisis predictor 
but, while entering with the correct sign, is not a significant determinant in the output loss equation. As a 
control, output loss in the preceding period (one period following the crisis) is included and is highly 
significant, but the financial variables still play a key role in determining the output cost of the crisis. 
Deterioration in the current account significantly increases the likelihood of a crisis. All standard errors 
are heteroskedasticity-corrected. 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
 
The single equation estimation results support these conclusions (Tables 3 and 4).  The 
evidence is that while it is unclear that external debt to asset ratios are a strong or consistent predictor 
of crises, they do signal that a crisis followed by persistent output losses is likely. 




The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that “costly” currency crises are 
predicted by the contingent liability-asset mismatch and that these balance sheet effects determine the 
likelihood that the crisis will be followed by persistent output losses. The theoretical motivation for the analysis is that the crisis transmits through the interaction between the Central Bank’s provision of 
insurance, the “easy lending” environment this fosters, and the probability of default being endogenous 
to the mismatch between external liabilities and assets. The evidence on whether crises themselves are 
predicted by debt to asset ratios is mixed: however liquid contingent liabilities relative to liquid reserves 
show up as a consistent signal that a crisis is likely to occur. Table 1: The Explanatory Variables: Natural logs/changes 
Control variables   Expected relationship with likelihood of a crisis  
Stock of external liabilities/stock of 
external assets (+) 
As the ratio of liabilities (stock outstanding) rises relative to 
assets, the likelihood of a currency crisis increases (and output 
losses are likely to persist) 
Change in stock of “capital flight” (+)  Symptom of the reversal of foreign lending and the fall in demand 
for domestic assets and should increase the likelihood of a crisis. 
Change in domestic credit to the 
private sector (-) 
The banking sector maintains liquidity, avoiding a credit crunch, 
and postponing or helping avoid the crisis. 
M2/nongoldreserves (+)  Easy lending compounds the moral hazard problem. As the ratio 
of contingent liabilities rises relative to assets, the likelihood of a 
run on the Central Bank increases.  









 Table 2: Bivariate Probit Results 
Dependent Variables: (1) Crisis in t followed by negative growth in t+2, Negative growth in GDP in t+2 
          (2) Crisis in t, Negative growth in GDP in t+2 
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
 (1)  (2) 
Simultaneous Equation  Crisis in t and 
negative 
growth in t+2 
Negative 
growth in 
GDP in t+2 
Crisis† in t  Negative 
growth in 
GDP in t+2 
No. of successes out of total (5177) 
observations: panel is unbalanced 
165 1594 556  1594 
Fall in output (t+1)  0.158 0.432 -0.097  0.429 
 (1.65)*  (7.64)***  (1.39) (7.62)*** 
Fall in output (concurrent)  0.124  -0.039  0.133  -0.038 
 (1.28)  (0.68)  (1.93)**  (0.67) 
Ratio of external liabilities to external 
assets (t-1) 
0.049 0.034 0.047  0.033 
 (1.66)*  (1.85)*  (2.06)**  (1.79)* 
Share of domestic credit to the 
banking sector in GDP 
-0.132 -0.056 -0.047 -0.055 
 (2.74)***  (1.68)*  (1.09)  (1.58)†
Change in current account surplus ( 
t-1) 
-0.004  0.000 0.000  0.000 
 (5.07)***  (0.03)  (0.25)  (0.08) 
Increase in capital flight ( t-1)  0.0002  0.006 -0.005  0.006 
 (7.98)***  (1.07)  (1.01)  (1.35) 
Change in ratio of M2 to non-gold 
reserves 
0.189  0.046  0.262  0.046 
 (2.72)***  (1.00)  (3.97)*** (0.98) 
Constant  -1.452 -0.300 -1.062  -0.300 
 (7.09)***  (2.17)**  (5.98)*** (2.09)** 
Overall Fit  <1%  <1%  <1%  <1% 
      
SURE        
Wald Test (H0 : no endogeneity)  H0 rejected***  H0 rejected***  H0 accepted  H0 accepted 
Observations included in probit 
analysis 
2253 2253 2253  2253 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; † Significant at 11% only; 












 (1)  (2) 
Dependent Variable  Crisis in t  Crisis in t 
Ratio of external liabilities to external 
assets (t-1) 
0.005 0.006 
 (1.16)  (1.48) 
Share of domestic credit to the 
banking sector in GDP 
-0.021 -0.025 
 (2.59)**  (3.07)** 
Change in current account surplus 
(t-1) 
-0.001 -0.001 
 (1.80)*  (1.81)* 
Increase in capital flight (t-1)  0.00002 0.00002 
 (7.73)**  (7.60)** 
Change in ratio of M2 to non-gold 
reserves 
0.054 0.055 
 (4.44)**  (4.55)** 
Fall in output (t+1)    0.004 
   (0.30) 
Overall fit  <1%  <1% 























Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   










 Table 4: Single Equation Probit Results 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 













Crisis in t 
and fall in 
output 
(t+2) 
Fall in output (t+1)  0.176  0.016   
 (9.26)**    (1.91)*   
Fall in output 
(concurrent) 
-0.011      
  (0.60)      
Ratio of external 
liabilities to external 
assets (t-1) 
0.016 0.005 0.004   
  (2.80)** (1.77)* (1.60)*   
Share of domestic 
credit to the banking 
sector in GDP 
  -0.013 -0.013  -0.014 
    (2.84)** (2.84)**  (3.43)** 
Change in current 
account surplus (t-1) 
  -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0001 
   (1.85)* (1.87)*  (1.83)* 
Increase in capital 
flight  (t-1) 
  0.00002 0.00002  0.00002 
    (6.04)** (6.24)**  (9.37)** 
Change in ratio of 
M2 to non-gold 
reserves 
  0.019 0.017  0.019 
   (2.89)** (2.68)**  (3.48)** 
Ratio of external 
liabilities to reserve 
assets  (t-1) 
     0.005 
      (2.28)* 
Overall Fit  <1%  <1%  <1%  <1% 
Observations  2936 2253 2253  2657 
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
† Without country-specific weights Appendix 
Table A1: Summary of Previously Used Crisis Predictors and the Underlying Rationale 
Type of Model  Transmission 
Mechanism 
Empirical Implications  Predictors used in previous studies  My Variables 
A. Links output and currency 
crises: example: Mendoza 





interact in a 
framework in 
which the
probability of a 




   Recessions 
Reserves and demand 
for money are crisis 
predictors; 
 
Currency crises are 
followed by 













Links output and financial 












Liberalization, Moral Hazard dummies, 
growth in GDP & real credit, nominal 
and real interest rates, inflation, 
movements in stock prices, fiscal 
deficit, M2/Reserves, rate of nominal 
depreciation. 
  n.a 
        Table A1 continued 
 
Type of Model  Transmission 
Mechanism 











fall in government 
reserves 
Fall in international 
reserves, worsening 
fiscal deficit pre-crisis, 
no policy change post-
crisis 
Fiscal Deficit, real GDP, 
government consumption, 
measures of domestic 
credit: examples: Collins, 




Stochastic Models and 
target zone models: 
Krugman and
Rotemberg (1991),




There is a stochastic 
element either to the 
demand for domestic 
money or to the nominal 
exchange rate 
The nominal exchange 
rate has a random walk 
component 
Volatility in M2/reserves: 














  Worsening exchange 
rate expectations
manifest in either higher 
wage demands or 




Examples: Flood and 






devaluation is one of 
many possible
equilibria: higher






Expectations proxies such 
as interest differentials 
growth in real wages, net 
government debt, both 
domestic and foreign, net 
errors and omissions as 
proxy for capital flight: 




public debt  (Table A1 continued) 
Type of Model  Transmission Mechanism  Empirical 
Implications 
Predictors used in 
previous studies 
My Variables 
Third - Generation 
Models:  
(a) Liquidity crises or 
bank runs 
(b) Insurance Models 
(c) Moral Hazard  
Examples: Dooley
(2000), Chinn and 
Kletzer (1999), Chang 
and Velasco (1998, 
1999).  
 
(a) Domestic economy is 
perceived as being over-
extended causing a run on 
the banks as investors want 
out before the expected 
devaluation; adverse shocks 
are amplified by the 
weakness of the domestic 
financial sector.  
(b) In insurance models, 
expectations do not jump, but 
central bank is monetizing the 
banking sector’s deficit: the 
government is lender of last 
resort to domestic financial 
sector. 
(c) Imperfect information/ 
informational asymmetries 
lead to a financial crisis that 
spill over into a currency crisis  
Increase in
inflows pre-crisis; 
drawing down of 
























such as interest 
differentials growth in 
real wages, net
government debt, both 
domestic and foreign, 
net errors and 
omissions as proxy for 
capital flight; domestic 
credit to the banking 
sector; increase in bank 
activity; various macro 
fundamentals: 
examples: Corsetti et al 
1998; Chinn and 
Dooley, 1999; 
 
Gross external liabilities 
(loans, equity and FDI) 
as well as net external 
short-term debt.     
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Data Sources: 
Various issues of the Balance of Payments Yearbook 
Balance of Payments, Version 5 
International Financial Statistics 
World Development Indicators 
Global Development Finance 
Country Specific Sources: Various Issues of  
IMF: Recent Economic Developments 
World Bank: Country Economic Memorandums 
Central bank Bulletins 
Rider, Mark (1994), “External Debt and Liabilities of Industrial Countries”, Reserve  
Bank of Australia Discussion Paper 9405. 




    
Balance of Payments (IFS line no. in parentheses): 
 
Current Account (78ald): ca 
Capital Account balance (78bcd): ka 
Direct Investment Abroad (78bdd): fdia 
Direct Investment in country (78bed): fdil 
Portfolio Investment Assets (78bfd): = Portfolio Investment Debt Assets +  
Portfolio Investment Equity Assets = equa 
Portfolio Investment Liabilities (78bgd): = Portfolio Investment Debt Liabilities +  
Portfolio Investment Equity Liabilities = equl 
Other Investment Assets (78bhd): la 
Other Investment Liabilities (78bid): ll 
Financial account (78bjd): fa= fdia-fdil+equa-equl+la-ll 
Net errors and omissions (78cad): eo=ca+ka+fa+fin 
Reserves and related items (financing items) (79dad): fin=fx+ef+imf 
Reserve assets (79ded): fx 
Exceptional financing (79ded): ef 













List of Countries 
 
 
Crisis Episodes Identified 
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